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AbsTrACT
Can cultural representations be used to therapeutic effect 
in the treatment of mood disorders like depression and 
anxiety? This article develops a theoretical framework 
that outlines how this might be achieved by way of mid- 
level cultural metrics that allow otherwise heterogeneous 
forms of representation to be grouped together. Its 
prediction is that abstract representations—as measured 
by Shannon entropy—will impact positively on anxiety, 
where concrete representations will positively impact on 
depression. The background to the prediction comes from 
construal level theory, a branch of social psychology that 
deals with the effects of abstraction on psychological 
distance; the types of cultural representations analysed 
include image, narrative and film. With a view to 
evaluating the hypothesis, the article surveys the 
empirical literature in art therapy, creative bibliotherapy 
and cinema therapy.
InTroduCTIon
How does culture relate to mental health? If this 
question is easy to ask, it is less easily answered. 
Both culture and mental health are highly contested 
terms, meaning that no two interlocutors are likely 
to agree on even basic definitions. In the first 
instance, this is because culture comprises catego-
ries of assortment like ethnicity, nationality and 
class, as well as symbolic practices such as reli-
gion, art and sport—a scenario that disperses the 
consideration of culture and mental health across 
a range of objects and disciplines.1 In the second, 
the fraught political history of medical classifi-
cation means that mental pathologies are the site 
of some of the most vigorous debates in the crit-
ical social sciences, ensuring that no one account 
of what constitutes mental illness attracts majority 
assent. While such tensions have been productive 
when it comes to unsettling normative diagnostic 
labels,2 there can be no doubt that they have also 
had the effect of balkanising the literature. To be 
sure, there is no shortage of interesting results and 
discussions.3 Nevertheless, it is equally true that the 
lack of a background theoretical framework mili-
tates against a deeper understanding of how culture 
shapes (and is shaped by) the experience of mental 
illness.
As no single exposition is likely to successfully 
anticipate what such a framework will look like 
in totality, I shall not attempt to deliver one here. 
Instead, I hope to outline how one metric of vari-
ation—abstraction—promises to connect different 
modes of cultural representation and mood disor-
ders in a way relevant to thinking about how 
cultural objects might be exploited therapeutically. 
The background to this will come from recent work 
in construal level theory (CLT), a branch of social 
psychology that links the experience of psycholog-
ical distance to the experience of abstraction. The 
animating claim of CLT is that the experience of 
abstraction cues expectations of psychological 
distance in the spatial, temporal, probabilistic and 
social spheres, just as the experience of distance cues 
expectations of abstraction.4 In itself, this observa-
tion seems relatively modest, but the achievement of 
CLT is to identify in abstraction a mid- level metric 
that is sufficiently general to be detectable across a 
wide range of stimuli, yet concrete enough to say 
something non- trivial about any given one of these. 
What this means in practice is that CLT allows for 
connection to be made between the experience of 
cultural artefacts in the broad sense and the dispo-
sition to behave in certain ways. That is, if the 
experience of abstraction (or concreteness) can be 
linked to expanded or contracted mental horizons, 
then the vehicle of that experience can be identified 
as a stimulus for the actions that take place within 
those horizons. And this, indeed, is what the liter-
ature shows: the experimental programme of CLT 
provides many examples linking moral, social, prac-
tical and creative behaviours (among others) to the 
experiences of abstraction and concreteness.5
Where these discoveries connect with the mood 
disorders is by way of a separate body of work that 
identifies depression and anxiety to be problems of 
overgeneralisation and undergeneralisation. While 
both conditions are obviously more complicated 
than can be explained by a one- dimensional char-
acterisation such as this, it remains the case that 
it picks out an important component of variation. 
Depression, for instance, is typically experienced 
as ‘a feeling of being dislodged from everyday 
activity’, 6 leaving the sufferer ‘an isolated object 
in a world without relationships’.7 Conversely, 
anxiety generates the sense of ‘being too much in 
contact with reality’8 and ‘the fearful anticipation 
of a catastrophe one is hopeless to prevent’. 9 What 
is visible in both conditions is attentional capture by 
interpretive frames that either strip away or exag-
gerate the constituent details of ordinary human 
experience. To this extent, CLT provides an empir-
ically sanctioned bridge between modes of cultural 
expression (and the historical factors behind them) 
and the experience of mental illness. It hardly needs 
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stating that this connection may well allow for insights into how 
cultural representations can be most effectively leveraged in 
support of therapeutic interventions.
Starting from these observations, I shall proceed here by deliv-
ering an overview of how different modes of cultural expression 
can evince abstraction and concreteness, and commenting on the 
relevance of this for anxiety and depression. For the most part, 
the cultural forms I will discuss relate to image, narrative and 
film. (Music I shall not consider due to lack of specialist knowl-
edge.) All these genres of representation use different materials 
against different horizons of expectation, with the result that 
there is no simple sense in which they can be said to be abstract 
or concrete. Nevertheless, if the ideas I propose here are to be 
tested, defensible and reliable measures of this representational 
tendency need to be developed. Necessarily, doing this will 
involve a wide- ranging discussion of cultural representation; to 
no less a degree, it is unavoidable that some of these discussions 
must deal with technical concepts in linguistics, information 
theory and cognitive science. However, to develop even one 
metric of health- relevant variation that extends across several 
cultural forms and which admits of objective estimation must 
surely be admitted as a useful exercise. At the very least, it chal-
lenges the de facto approach, which is to treat different modes 
of expression on an individual basis, without ever taking a global 
overview.
CLT, depressIon And AnxIeTy
If CLT and mood disorders are to contextualise an analysis of 
cultural forms, then the relation between the two needs to be 
properly explicated. The present section will do this by way of a 
short review of the CLT literature that discusses how its findings 
might be brought into contact with cognate findings on depres-
sion and anxiety. This will deliver the background knowledge 
needed for the subsequent engagement with specific modes of 
cultural representation.
For all that CLT is communicated in a specialist vocabulary, 
the insights behind it are rather intuitive. Central among these 
is the idea that human cognition persistently links abstraction 
and distance. ‘Abstraction’ in this connection relates to the level 
of detail associated with a stimulus, with CLT proponents label-
ling a high- detail stimulus as having a ‘low’ construal level and a 
low- detail stimulus as having a ‘high’ construal level. ‘Distance’ 
equates with psychological distance, which comprises distance in 
the spatial, temporal, probabilistic and social dimensions. (The 
adjective ‘psychological’ denotes that it is the subject’s perception 
or imagination of distance that matters, rather than any physical 
measure of distance, even if the two are frequently connected.) 
The CLT proposal is that that expectations of distance on these 
four dimensions are cued by high- construal level stimuli, just as 
the experience of concreteness is projected to promote expec-
tations of nearness. And by a reciprocal process again, the 
experience of psychological distance leads to expectations of 
high- construal level, just as the experiences of nearness cue low- 
construal expectations. In the words of two leading CLT theo-
rists, ‘different levels of construal serve to expand and contract 
one’s mental horizons and thus mentally traverse psychological 
distances’.10
Some examples should make these claims clearer. Take the 
high- construal noun ‘civilisation’: typically, this prompts one 
to expect psychological distance along several dimensions—
thus, one speaks of ‘Roman civilisation’ (temporal distance), 
‘Japanese civilisation’ (spatial distance) or ‘alien civilisation’ 
(social distance), but never ‘Oxford civilisation’. In the other 
direction, distance cues high- construal expectations. Probabil-
istically remote events, for instance, prompt low- detail hypo-
theticals (‘if alien civilisations exist, we will discover whether 
there are cultural universals’), when likely events enjoin more 
detailed ones (‘if there’s traffic on Oxford High Street, I’ll divert 
via Queen’s Lane’). Similar considerations obtain with respect 
to low- construal stimuli, though here of course the relation is 
with nearness. For example, a detailed statement like ‘The venue 
for Julia’s vocal performance has poor acoustics’ is typically 
consonant with Julia’s recital happening soon and not in three 
decades, just as ‘Julia hopes to be still able to sing on her 100th 
birthday’ does not usually enjoin one to ask whether the room in 
which she sings will have air conditioning.
In themselves, these examples are merely suggestive; the 
achievement of CLT is to support them with an experimental 
programme that links a diverse range of behavioural and cogni-
tive outcomes to the experience of both psychological distance 
and construal level. With respect to distance, the evidence is 
that framing actions as far away on one of the dimensions of 
psychological distance makes high- construal purposiveness 
salient while inhibiting considerations of low- construal context. 
Liberman and Trope,11 for instance, show that action state-
ments like ‘locking a door’ are represented in terms of constit-
uent subactions (‘putting a key in the lock’) when located in the 
imminent future, but in terms of agentive intention (‘securing 
the house’) when set a year from the present. Cognate results are 
available for spatial distance,12 probabilistic distance13 and social 
distance.14 Another effect of distance is to prime for morality 
over empathy (ie, the application of abstract normative princi-
ples over the emotional engagement with the needs of another). 
In this connection, Eyal, Liberman and Trope demonstrate that 
the violation of widely accepted moral rules (sibling incest, 
eating pets, desecrating national symbols) is judged more harshly 
(ie, more morally) in far- future conditions than in near- future 
ones15 —presumably because contextual mitigating factors are 
not in play. Intensity of emotion is also linked to distance cues, 
with events like visiting the dentist being imagined to be less 
intense when imagined to be further in the future than near to 
the present;16 similarly, objects and events moving away from 
the subject are felt as having less emotional valence than object 
and events moving towards.17 Some other behaviours that have 
been identified as affected by considerations of construal level 
and distance include the propensity to conform,18 the align-
ment of goals with desires,19 the perception of expertise,20 the 
experience of shame,21 the appreciation of creativity,22 the use 
of politeness23 and the making of economic decisions.24 In all 
cases, the general result is the same: abstraction and psycholog-
ical distance are cues for one another, just as concreteness and 
psychological nearness are also.
As indicated, the link between these considerations and the 
mood disorders comes by way of attentional capture in depres-
sion and anxiety. Though both conditions share a common 
cognitive trait in overrumination and are thus often comorbid,25 
the focus of rumination tends to be quite distinct—and this 
is where CLT considerations come into view. Starting with 
depression, this should be understood here to mean ‘major 
depressive disorder’ (MDD) or ‘persistent depressive disorder’ 
(PDD) as classified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM- V). Typical symptoms of 
both involve depressed mood, diminished interest in activities, 
weight loss/gain, insomnia/hypersomnia, psychomotor agita-
tion/retardation, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness and/or guilt, 
lack of concentration or decisiveness, and recurrent thoughts of 
death.26 MDD requires more symptoms for a shorter period for 
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diagnosis; PDD requires fewer symptoms for longer. Both are to 
be distinguished from bipolar disorder, which the DSM- V now 
classes alongside the psychoses.27 With respect to the phenom-
enology of both conditions it would seem that the ruminative 
emphasis falls on capture by high- construal, negatively valent 
thoughts and memories. For instance, Watkins and Teasdale 
note that ‘overgeneral memory is a disorder specific phenom-
enon found in depression and posttraumatic stress disorder but 
not in generalised anxiety disorder, social phobia or obsessive- 
compulsive disorder’,28 with Watkins amplifying this into the 
more general claim that ‘the level of goal/action identification 
adopted in major depression is abnormal and dysfunctional, with 
patients with depression tending to adopt more abstract levels 
of goal/action identification, at least for negative information, 
than non- depressed controls’.29 Significantly, the CLT- predicted 
distance priming that this experience of abstraction should enjoin 
can be readily identified in first- hand accounts of depression.
Matthew Ratcliffe, for example, collates the following descrip-
tions: ‘There was just an unfathomable distance between me and 
any other human being’;30 ‘It feels as though you’re watching 
life from a long distance’;31 ‘the world looks different—familiar 
things seem strange, distant’;32 ‘things are no longer appear 
available; they are strangely distant’;33 ‘I was terribly alone, lost 
in a far- away place’;34 ‘You’ve lost a habitable earth. You’ve lost 
the invitation to live that the universe extends to us at every 
moment’.35 There can be no doubting the salience of psycholog-
ical distance in these reports.
Moving on to anxiety, this condition should be taken here 
as a proxy for ‘generalised anxiety disorder’, which the DSM- V 
defines as ‘excessive, uncontrollable anxiety or worry for at least 
6 months and associated with two of restlessness, fatigue, irrita-
bility, muscle tension, and sleep disturbance’.36 At first glance, the 
literature seems to identify these symptoms as a form of atten-
tional capture by high- construal stimuli. Watkins, for instance, 
concludes that generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) is ‘charac-
terised by a predisposition towards adopting an abstract level 
of goal/action identification as the prepotent operational level 
… patients with GAD demonstrate a biassed tendency towards 
a more abstract level of processing’.37 However, though this 
formulation may be technically correct—after all, it is certainly 
true that worry deals in hypotheticals—it is questionable how 
useful it is. (And note the disagreement with Watkins and Teas-
dale quoted above.)38 Instead, it would seem more accurate to 
characterise anxiety as the making concrete of ostensibly abstract 
threats. Mathews, for example, notes that anxiety is marked by 
‘persistent awareness of possible future danger, which is repeat-
edly rehearsed without ever being resolved’39—an appreciation 
that is echoed in a number of studies that identify anxiety as 
a form of ‘selective processing that fits [the anxious individu-
al’s] view of the world as dangerous’.40 From a CLT perspec-
tive, this amounts to collapsing the psychological distance on 
the probabilistic dimension. By making unlikely events—that is, 
events that are probabilistically distant—salient, anxiety cues the 
collapsing of mental horizons into the here and now.
A cursory examination of first- hand descriptions of anxiety 
bears out this view of anxiety as an overconcrete immersion in 
the near- hypothetical. Though equivalent collations of anxiety 
experiences to those available for depression are less easy to 
find, discussions on social media forums offer some useful evoca-
tions. For instance, a psychiatrist on Reddit recalls a patient as 
saying anxiety ‘feel[s] like she tripped and the moment where 
you don’t know if you are going to catch yourself or not is how 
she felt all day long.’41 Another commenter likens it to what 
happens when your ‘stomach turns and you get hot and your 
heart pounds, whatever happens when you think something 
went very wrong and you’re about to catch shit for it’;42 a second 
exhorts the reader to ‘Imagine if every small decision had life or 
death consequences’.43 An author on the Anxiety and Depression 
Association of America website recalls, ‘I’d be stuck in traffic and 
these irritating voices would take my brain hostage. “Did you 
leave the coffee on? The house will catch fire, the neighbours 
will burn!”’44 Another recounts, ‘I don’t see five to ten ants. I see 
the inevitable 100 to 200 that I imagine will invade and even-
tually carry off our house. It’s very hard for me to deal with the 
here and now when I am catastrophizing’.45 The examples could 
be multiplied, but the point is clear: anxiety, contra depression, 
shrinks the horizon of cognition into immediately nearby spatial 
and temporal concerns.
The question that follows from framing mood disorders in this 
way is whether doing so provides any therapeutic insights into 
anxiety and depression. The answer would seem to be that it does, 
even if such insights are not explicitly articulated using CLT.46 
Specifically, there is a small (but growing) body of evidence that 
exposing the depressed and the anxious to stimuli that exhibit a 
construal level opposite to that which characterises their condi-
tion yields positive therapeutic results. In the case of depression, 
Werner- Seidler and Moulds47 establish that prompting depressed 
and recovered individuals to recall an autobiographical memory 
in abstract and concrete modes yields a positive impact in the 
concrete mode; in their words, ‘a concrete processing mode 
enabled positive memory recall to have a reparative effect on 
mood for depressed and recovered participants’.48 Equivalently, 
Watkins et al show that complementing treatment as usual (TAU) 
for depression with concreteness training ‘seems to be an effi-
cacious treatment for mild to moderate depression in primary 
care, producing significantly better outcomes than TAU’.49 
Viewed through the lens of CLT, these results are explained 
by the adopting of a low- construal cognitive frame, where the 
depressive tendency towards ruminative overgeneralisation is 
recalibrated towards shorter psychological distances. These 
distances, being more amenable to everyday projects and goals, 
challenge the impotence in the face of the cosmos that charac-
terises depression.
With respect to anxiety, the situation once again seems less 
clear- cut. Amir, Beard, Cobb and Bomyea demonstrate that 
diverting attention away from threatening stimuli succeeds in 
reducing anxious feelings50 —a result that is replicated in several 
places across the literature.51 However, there is also evidence 
that actively exposing anxious individuals to inducing stimuli 
can, over the course of time, ameliorate symptoms.52 How can 
these different data be reconciled? The key to doing this comes 
with recognising the role played by abstraction in both proto-
cols. Attention diversion techniques invariably work by training 
participants to attend to neutral stimuli over threatening ones; as 
such, they strip away one dimension of experience—valence—
and thereby shift the individual’s perception of the world into 
a marginally more abstract mode. It can be argued that expo-
sure therapies do the same, but in a radically different way: by 
inserting the threatening stimulus into a series of encounters, 
they dampen its singularity and subordinate it to an abstract cate-
gory that is amenable to cognitive manipulation. What emerges, 
therefore, is the finding that ‘a tendency to preferentially attend 
toward or away from threat, relative to an equal distribution of 
attention irrespective of threat, results in greater reduction in 
clinical symptoms and diagnoses’.53 In other words, so long as a 
high- construal perspective is adopted—whether by diversion or 
habituation—the anxiety- inducing character of a stimulus will 
tend to diminish.
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In sum, there exist reasonable grounds for thinking that the 
results of CLT have relevance for the treatment of both depres-
sion and anxiety. I stress, once more, that this does not amount 
to saying that they are explained by CLT, or that CLT captures 
the full phenomenology of either condition. If it did, it would 
be a damning verdict on psychological medicine for it to have 
missed so straightforward a result, given the amount of research 
that anxiety and depression have stimulated over the years. 
Instead, the value of the CLT perspective is that it allows for 
connections to be made with cultural processes that may have 
a therapeutic value for both conditions. These processes will be 
the target of the next section.
ConsTruAL LeveL And CuLTure
Viewing culture through the lens of abstraction is not a new idea. 
As long ago as 1908, Wilhelm Worringer wrote of ‘the antithetic 
relation of empathy and abstraction’, and how the impulse 
towards abstraction ‘finds in beauty in the life- denying inor-
ganic, in the crystalline or, in general terms, in all general law 
and necessity’.54 For Worringer, the motivation towards abstrac-
tion is ‘the immense spiritual dread of space’,55 which leaves 
humanity ‘tormented by the entangled inter- relationship and 
flux of the phenomena of the outer world’.56 By positing abstrac-
tion as the antidote to the anxiety entrained by the unpredict-
ability of the world, it should be clear that Worringer is making a 
connection between mood and forms of cultural representation 
that is cognate to the issues under discussion here.
In the present section, my aim is to go beyond Worringer’s 
purely qualitative appreciation of how abstraction shapes the 
experience of culture and develop quantitative metrics that 
allow for such abstraction to be measured. The value of such 
measurement is that it allows for cultural representations to 
be compared with one another, both within and between the 
categories they belong to. This is a potentially controversial 
move, given the long- standing resistance to such acts of quanti-
fication in the humanities and the interpretive social sciences.57 
Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that recent work in areas like 
cognitive cultural studies will have gone some distance towards 
illustrating the power of using empirically informed methodolo-
gies to engage with the symbolic apparatus of culture.58 Equally, 
the movement towards the experimental humanities points to 
the value of having manipulable measures that allow for the 
testing of predictions against real- world audiences.59 Here, both 
considerations will allow for an account of different forms of 
cultural representation that predict their impact on the mood 
disorders.
At a practical level, I shall focus mostly on construal level as 
my variable of interest. This is not at all to dismiss psycholog-
ical distance as playing an important role in the operations of 
culture; indeed, I have written previously on how manipula-
tions of distance play a crucial role in establishing the cogni-
tive effect of genres such as science fiction.60 Instead, my view is 
that the necessarily synoptic exercise of surveying how distance 
emerges in several media would eclipse the no less important 
(and comparatively underdeveloped) issue of abstraction, which 
must therefore be my principal focus here. Saying this, however, 
invites the question of how construal level can be quantified. 
While it is often intuitively obvious whether a representation is 
abstract or concrete, this is of little value when precise compar-
isons are needed. Moreover, the experimental manipulations of 
construal level in the literature, though fit for purpose, are not 
generalisable across multiple modes of stimulus presentation. 
What is therefore needed is a reliable proxy for construal level 
that yields precise values and can be extended across a variety 
of media.
I propose here to use Shannon entropy as this measure.61 Like 
the thermodynamic concept it is derived from, Shannon entropy 
(hereafter just entropy) is a measure of how much structure is 
required to encode a message, with high entropy messages being 
more unpredictable than low entropy messages. As the central 
concept in information theory, entropy is surrounded by a 
forbidding formal vocabulary. Nevertheless, it is relatively easy 
to illustrate by way of a linguistic example. For instance, it is easy 
to see that asking someone to complete a three- word phrase that 
starts with ‘the northern’ will more often produce ‘the northern 
lights’ or ‘the northern hemisphere’ than ‘the northern engine’ 
or ‘the northern babysitter’. This is because, in English, the 
former two phrases occur with a much higher frequency than the 
latter, meaning that any guess concerning how the phrase should 
be completed is more likely to be correct if it uses ‘lights’ or 
‘hemisphere’ as the relevant word. In this sense, the phrase ‘the 
northern lights’ has less entropy than ‘the northern babysitter’, 
as it would require fewer guesses to reconstruct it in the event of 
the last word being missing.
In more formal terms, entropy is therefore ‘a measure of the 
information contained in a message as opposed to the part of 
the message that is strictly determined (hence predictable) by 
inherent structures’.62 What this involves in practice is calcu-
lating the average freedom to vary each symbol or item in a given 
message relative to the constraints that operate on that message. 
This is done using the following formula, where H corresponds 
to the entropy of the message X, i denotes a value in the range 
0≤ i ≤ k when k is the number of symbols in the message, and 
p(xi) is the probability of a specific symbol xi occurring:
 H(X) = −
∑
i p(xi)log2p(xi) 
For those unfamiliar with the formalism, the sigma operator 
‘Σ’ means that if there are k symbols, then the entropy should be 
calculated for each one of them and the results added together. 
The log2p(xi) quantity picks out a number y, such that 2
y=p(xi). 
Though this formula outputs a value in bits for any well- defined 
system, this number is often normalised so it can only take values 
between ‘0’ and ‘1’ by dividing by the quantity log2(k); this quan-
tity is called metric entropy. To see how the formula works in 
advance of its use below, take a simple example: a coin toss with 
an unbiased coin. There are two possible results (heads or tails) 
with the same probability each; thus p(xi)=0.5 for i=1 and i=2. 
The entropy of the system is calculated by summing across both 
possible results: – [(0.5 × log2(0.5) + (0.5 × log2(0.5)]=1. Thus, 
this system can be completely described using 1 bit of informa-
tion. (Note that the metric entropy is also one in this example, 
as log2
2 =1.)
The relevance of entropy for the discussion of construal level 
and culture is that it reliably tracks abstraction. The core cogni-
tive operation of abstraction is to strip away redundant detail 
and make a given system predictable—a function that reaches 
its apotheosis in mathematics and logic, but which is present in 
any act of classification or generalisation. Conversely, concrete-
ness entails unpredictability, with its limit case being a purely 
random distribution of elements where the only structure is 
that described by the normal distribution. In the terminology 
under discussion, this means, counterintuitively, that low 
entropy corresponds to high- construal level and high entropy 
corresponds to low- construal level. If this identity is allowed, 
it means that entropy can be used as a proxy for identifying 
the likely impact of cultural representations on anxiety and 
depression.
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Figure 1 Metric entropy scores for three images, where ‘0’ is the lowest possible value and ‘1’ is the highest. The rectangular grid is highly 
predictable and has a low score. The middle image—taken from Louis le Brocquy’s illustrations to Thomas Kinsella’s translation of the medieval Irish 
epic, Táin Bó Cuailgne—blends pictorial and schematic elements, and takes a value in the middle of the distribution. The final image, as a photograph, 
lacks any easily defined organising principle, and thus comes close to the entropy of a purely random distribution of pixels (ie, a score of 1).
Naturally, all of this raises the question of what such analysis 
might look like in practice. I shall initiate it now by giving an 
overview of how three modes of representation—image, narra-
tive and film—can be discussed in terms of construal level. I 
would like it to be noted from the outset that my treatments 
of each area will be highly summary in character, and for every 
operational choice I make, I acknowledge that a specialist will be 
able to make the case for a different one. In defence of my proce-
dure, I state here that my aim is only to demonstrate in principle 
how one might approach these three areas. Any thoroughgoing 
practical demonstration would need to be more circumspect in 
its approach, if also longer than is useful for an article- length 
exposition.
Image
Most discussions of the therapeutic potential of image focus on 
the production rather than the reception of visual artworks.63 
However, as Vidler notes ‘anxiety, estrangement, and their 
psychological counterparts, anxiety neuroses and phobias have 
been intimately linked to the aesthetics of space’.64 For Vidler, 
this is a specifically modern phenomenon, but it can readily be 
seen that the attempt to ‘permeate the formal with the psycho-
logical’65 can inhabit the visual art of any period. The 70 k BCE 
ochre carvings from the Blombos Cave, for example, display a 
geometrical linear styling that has no obvious mimetic inten-
tion;66 conversely, the 17 k BCE animal paintings of the Lascaux 
Cave evince a highly concrete realism.67 Closer to the present, 
Celtic art of the Hallstatt style (1200–500 BCE) is geometrical, 
linear and spare, while that in the La Tène (450–1 BCE) style is 
curvilinear, richly detailed and organic68—no less than the formal 
innovations of the twentieth- century avant- garde contrasts with 
the nineteenth- century pictorial realism. The point is that the 
oscillation between mimetic detail and formal abstraction is a 
pattern the repeats across the history of visual culture.
To the extent that this is so, entropy should provide a reli-
able measure of abstraction in an image. The question concerns 
how it might be calculated. The standard protocol for doing this 
is to use colour as the variable i in the entropy formula, such 
that it takes a value from the set of k colours that make up an 
image. The object taking the value can be thought of as the pixels 
making up the image, so that for any colour i, a given image will 
contain m pixels of that colour. Thus, for any randomly chosen 
pixel from the total of n pixels in the image, the probability of it 
being colour i will be the fraction n/m. To illustrate, take an 8- bit 
grayscale computer image: this format allows 256 (ie, 28) shades 
of grey that can occur in any admixture. The probability of a 
randomly selected pixel exhibiting any given one of these shades 
will be given by dividing the total number of pixels exhibiting 
the shade by the total pixel count of the image. In turn, this 
allows the image entropy to be calculated by summing the 256 
products of each shade’s probability by the log base 2 of this 
probability—a number that can then be normalised by dividing 
by log2(256). As even small images have very large numbers of 
pixels, it would be impractical to reproduce such a calculation 
here; it is easier just to show the results generated for specific 
images (figure 1), which I calculate using a python function 
specifically scripted for the task. As can be seen, there is a clear 
linear progression such that the more abstract an image is, the 
lower the entropy score.
Directing these results back to CLT, what can be said is that 
entropy tracks abstraction—and therefore construal level—in 
images in a reliable way. High- construal images, in virtue of 
exhibiting law- like regularities, are predictable and have low 
entropy; conversely, low- construal images frustrate schematic 
perception and have high entropy. The prediction that follows 
is that high entropy images should be of value for individuals 
with depression, when low entropy images should be of value 
for those suffering from anxiety. Such a claim invites assess-
ment: is it the case that entropy tracks the therapeutic value 
of images?
To the extent that there is evidence available, it would seem 
that it does, looked at from both a historical and an experimental 
perspective. Starting with anxiety, Currey and Kasser69 compare 
the therapeutic impact of colouring a mandala design, colouring 
a generically abstract plaid design and colouring by way of a free- 
form unguided exercise. The results clearly show that colouring 
low entropy images in the form of the plaid design and the 
mandala reduced anxiety in a statistically significant way rela-
tive to colouring the free- form design, which has no impact—
with this outcome being replicated in an independent follow- up 
study.70 In a separate study, Sandmire, Gorham, Rankin et al71 
compare the impact on anxiety of mandala design, free- form 
painting, clay sculpting, collage making and drawing .Small 
sample sizes by condition did not allow the different interven-
tions to be statistically distinguished. Nevertheless, given that the 
largest group chose the mandala design, the positive results they 
establish for art therapy across all conditions are consistent with 
the CLT abstraction hypothesis. Though more work is needed, 
these results clearly point to high entropy images as having a 
potentially positive impact on anxiety.  on F
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Figure 2 Greimas’s six- term actantial account of narrative.
With respect to depression, the evidence is that the types of 
images produced by depressed individuals are of a low entropy 
kind, to the extent that they use less colour, have more empty 
space, are more constricted, are less effortful and are less mean-
ingful.72 Correspondingly, it is unsurprising that high entropy 
images appear to be more therapeutically efficacious for depres-
sion. For instance, in a study that involved patients with cancer 
in a non- abstract watercolour- based art therapy intervention, 
Bar- Sela, Atid, Danos, Gebay et al73 found that depression was 
reduced while anxiety levels remained the same. Beyond this, 
it is difficult to generalise, as most experimental studies do not 
distinguish between the specific types of art therapy adminis-
tered. Nevertheless, it is possible that the relative preponderance 
of concrete and mimetic modes of representation in art therapy 
is responsible for the positive impact on depression identified in 
several meta- analyses.74
It would seem, then, that there is evidence in support of the 
view that CLT effects on depression and anxiety can be tracked 
using entropy as a proxy, and they take the direction predicted. 
Necessarily, this requires further testing if the hypothesis is 
to receive the support it requires. Equally, a more cognitively 
‘thick’ account of visual perception is needed to allow for 
entropy- reduction processes (like face and scene recognition) 
that improve the predictability of images. Nevertheless, it should 
be evident that the CLT- entropy approach points to a potentially 
important line of inquiry for the discussion of the therapeutic 
impact of images.
narrative
If art therapy has an established therapeutic pedigree, treat-
ment using literary materials has emerged in the last number of 
years as a parallel method of engaging with various disorders.75 
Variously termed ‘book therapy’ or ‘creative bibliotherapy’, the 
idea is that ‘active immersion in great literature can help relieve, 
restore, or reinvigorate the troubled mind’.76 Though certainly 
an appealing prospect, the field is new and there is no robust 
proposal as to why literature should have a therapeutic effect in 
the first place. Montgomery and Maunders probably offer the 
most considered approach when they argue for literature as a 
vehicle for Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) effects,77 though 
this ultimately relies on the same ideas concerning readerly iden-
tification in fiction that underwrite less developed approaches.78 
Moreover, even allowing that literature has a therapeutic effect, 
no approach predicts how different types of literature will 
interact with any one of the 297 or so conditions that at least one 
diagnostic system identifies as defining the repertoire of mental 
illness.79
As scoping a response to these problems for all forms of liter-
ature is obviously impractical, I shall restrict myself here to 
outlining how a CLT- informed entropic perspective might be 
used to make predictions concerning the therapeutic impact of 
narrative literature. Naturally, this poses the problem of how 
narratives can be understood as ‘abstract’ or ‘concrete’—not 
least because there are several levels, ranging from the lexical to 
the sentential to the discursive, that may exhibit such qualities. 
One useful concept for probing the distinction is that of narra-
tivity.80 This is a global term that indexes the extent to which a 
cultural artefact lends itself to narrative elaboration across all its 
elements. A text with a high degree of narrativity will exhibit 
a judicious mix of surprise and predictability, with a prepon-
derance of either surprise or predictability being deleterious to 
a text’s narrativity. As David Herman notes, ‘there is a lower 
limit of narrativity, past which certain ‘stories’ activate so few 
world models that they can no longer be processed as stories at 
all’, just as there is ‘an upper limit of narrativity, past which the 
tellable gives way to stereotypical, and the point of a narrative, 
the reason for its being told, gets lost or at least obscured’.81 In 
other words, a highly concrete text will be one that frustrates 
narrativity by resisting predictability, while an abstract text frus-
trates it by being too general. The connection here with entropy 
is obvious: texts that are either too high or too low in entropy 
are poor in narrativity.
One way in which these distinctions can be illustrated is by 
way of the link between character and action—a central plank 
of all forms of narrative. In this regard, one achievement of 
formalist models of narrative has been the identification of narra-
tive ‘grammars’, where the key intervention involves abstracting 
recurrent classes of action from a given class of narratives to 
arrive at a general model. These models often generalise across 
categories like region and genre,82 but there also exist accounts 
that identify features purportedly present in all narratives.83 
Their value for the present purpose is that they offer one clear 
dimension on which narrativity varies, to the extent that texts 
that entirely coincide with, or entirely deviate from, narrative 
grammars are also poor in narrativity. I shall illustrate this here 
using A J Greimas’s actantial model84 —not out of any convic-
tion that Greimas is correct where others are wrong, but simply 
because his model is well known and supports a formal demon-
stration that can be readily extended to other models.
For Greimas, a character in a narrative can take one of six 
actants or roles: it can be a subject, an object, a helper, an oppo-
nent, a sender or a receiver (figure 2). The subject and object 
are paired in a relation of desire, want or need, with the subject 
exercising this relation on the object. Take Ian Fleming’s James 
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Bond novels: here, Bond is typically the subject, with the defence 
of democratic values and the social order being the object. The 
helper and opponent are paired in a relation of power, such 
that they either augment or detract from the subject’s ability to 
pursue the object. In the Bond narratives, the helpers can be Q, 
the Bond girl, Felix Leiter and so forth; the opponent is mani-
fested through the agents of the USSR and the various crim-
inal enterprises that Bond confronts. The sender and receiver 
are paired in an axis of transmission, where the sender legiti-
mates the subject’s actions, the value of which is delivered to the 
receiver. Thus, M, as representative of the Crown, authorises 
Bond’s actions, which benefit the British public and the wider 
democratic world. According to Greimas, these categories are 
present in all narratives, such that any character can be identified 
with a given actant on a given appearance (ie, they can be iden-
tified with different actants at different points in the narrative). 
Thus, what the actantial model defines is an underlying principle 
of organisation that maps the information contained in the set of 
character appearances into the information contained in the set 
of actantial roles.
Viewing this model through the lens of entropy, the six actants 
define a set of values that partition the set of character appear-
ances. This means that, for any given character appearance, that 
appearance can be classified under a category i, where i belongs 
to the set (sender, receiver, subject, object, helper, opponent). 
The sum of the character appearances in each category will then 
total the amount of appearances in the narrative. The proba-
bility, pi, of a given appearance being a particular actant is found 
by dividing the number of appearances in that category by the 
total number of appearances. As per the formula, the entropy 
is calculated by summing the products of each probability pi by 
log2(pi). In the case where there is an equal likelihood of a char-
acter belonging to one of the six roles in a given appearance, 
the metric entropy of the narrative is exactly 1, as there is no 
structure present. The latter enters into the picture via genre, 
which will foreground and background different actantial roles, 
thereby changing the relative probabilities involved. In Grei-
mas’s words, ‘an articulation of actors constitutes a particular 
tale; a structure of actants constitutes a genre’.85 To properly 
represent this would require exact data on the relative propor-
tion of actantial roles in different genres, which it is beyond the 
scope of the present article to provide. Instead, it is more useful 
to look at how entropy and narrativity relate to these considera-
tions of abstraction and concreteness.
In this regard, the tendency towards concreteness has a clear 
expression in the realist novel. As an exercise in ‘the mimesis of 
consciousness’,86 realism participates in the unpredictability of 
its subject matter. That is, by attenuating the connection between 
actantial role and character identity in favour of character iden-
tity, narrative realism refuses the predictability of a schema and 
makes salient instead the sense of subjective freedom that attends 
personhood. Given the social orientation of much human cogni-
tion,87 it is unsurprising that that texts exhibiting this tendency 
should be narrative to a high degree. Nevertheless, it is no less 
true that the wholesale reproduction of subjective experience as 
found in texts like James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake88 or Virginia 
Woolf ’s The Waves89 have the effect of reducing narrativity. 
By requiring the reader to invest sustained cognitive labour 
before she can extract the general principle from the concrete 
particular, they frustrate the sense of (immediate) universality 
that is implicit in highly narrative texts.
On the abstract side of the spectrum, quasi- formulaic narra-
tives like folk tales and myths are close mirror images of realist 
fiction, in that they also have psychological verisimilitude and 
functional roles, even if here the functional role predomi-
nates. The result is that such genres evince the same degree of 
narrativity as realist fiction, while having lower entropy. The 
‘pathological’ tail to this end of the narrativity distribution is 
probably to be found in those simplified narratives that entirely 
dispense with specific actants. These are most commonly found 
in children’s discourse, which evolve over the course of devel-
opment from primitive assertions of desire or causality to fully 
worked- out stories.90 Notably, such narratives are also visible 
in the ‘anti- narratives’ of modernist fiction, which strategically 
interrupt the story- telling process so as to highlight its inade-
quacy to human experience. Take, for instance, Samuel Beckett’s 
trilogy of novels, Molloy, Moran and The Unnamable, where all 
distinctions of character and structure eventually collapse into 
the ‘Where now? Who now? When now?’ of The Unnamable’s 
immobile subject.91
The general picture that emerges from this is that there is a 
clear alignment between the concept of entropy under discus-
sion here and narrative structure. Moreover, this alignment is 
not merely theorised to exist, but has a long- standing expres-
sion in narratological terminology. But while this is welcome and 
satisfying, it is of incidental importance to the present inquiry 
if it cannot be connected with anxiety and depression. In this 
connection, the evidence is promising, if limited. As might be 
expected, the difficulty of making lengthy narrative materials 
amenable to experimental manipulation means that such studies 
as exist tend to focus on shorter narratives or narrative selec-
tions. With respect to depression, Carney and Robertson show 
that individuals exhibiting traits that correlate with depression 
are more strongly engaged by a high entropy version of a narra-
tive text than a low one.92 On the side of anxiety, Glavin and 
Montgomery93 and Montgomery and Maunders94 offer a meta- 
analyses of studies that use literature in the treatment of various 
conditions and find either modest effects or no effects, but 
suggest that lack of comparability and poor design make defini-
tive conclusions untrustworthy. Orthogonal to both, Troscianko 
shows substantial effects for fiction reading on several dimen-
sions of behaviour relating to eating disorders, but the classifica-
tion of fiction type is determined by thematic focus rather than 
abstraction or concreteness.95 Beyond this, the research litera-
ture offers little in the way of robust empirical evidence, even if 
there is no shortage of speculative pieces.
Thus, though there is no evidence against the proposal that 
abstraction impacts differentially on mood disorders, and some 
small evidence for it, a programme of testing is needed to prop-
erly establish the effect of narrative abstraction on depression 
and anxiety. I am currently engaged in an ongoing programme 
of such testing, which aims to ground the efflorescence of 
interest in creative bibliotherapy with solid empirical data. As 
yet, however, no solid conclusions can be reached concerning 
the role of abstraction in the cognitive impact of fiction—even if 
there are reasons to be hopeful that it might yet be used to good 
therapeutic effect.
Film
Just as literature has been suggested as a possible vehicle for 
therapeutic intervention, so too has film. The practice of using 
‘motion pictures in a structured manner with specific popula-
tions for particular therapeutic gains’96 dates back to at least 
the 1940s,97 and continues today in a wide range of healthcare 
contexts.98 To the extent that it is theorised, ‘cinematherapy’ 
is framed in much the same way as its literary equivalent, with 
many theorists even going so far as to explicitly identify it as a 
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Figure 3 Illustration frames from the Heider- Simmel demonstration frame (left) and Apocalypse Now.
Figure 4 Entropy by frame for Heider- Simmel and Apocalypse Now.
form of bibliotherapy.99 Given the problems with bibliotherapy, 
this does little to clarify how cinematherapy might work, but it 
does point to CBT- style effects as the most commonly assigned 
mechanism.100 Though this may well be the case, the fact 
remains that such accounts say little about the specifically filmic 
dimension of cinematherapy, or indeed how different types of 
film relate to different conditions.
As will be anticipated, my suggestion is that abstraction 
provides one way of approaching this issue. In fact, given that 
film contains both visual and narrative components, it can 
be readily seen that two ways in which filmic entropy can be 
measured have already been covered. The task comes with 
outlining how these approaches might be adapted to account 
for the specific effects of cinema. In the former scenario, this 
involves extending the static entropy measure of a still image 
into a dynamic register of multiples of images per second; in the 
latter, it means incorporating the issues that arise when charac-
ters and actants are instantiated in physically perceivable agents 
and objects (ie, actors and props). Once both issues are dealt 
with, it should then become possible to consider the therapeutic 
impact of film.
To start with the issue of dynamic entropy, there is an obvious 
sense in which the relevant abstraction measure for film is not 
the average entropy across its frames, but the distribution of the 
entropy values these frames take. Take, for instance, the Heider- 
Simmel demonstration,101 which is the famous animation that 
uses moving shapes to illustrate the human propensity to assign 
agency to objects. Consider, at the same time, the introductory 
sequence to Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now,102 which 
uses richly worked cinematography to conflate the external chaos 
of the Vietnam war with the inner turmoil of its protagonist, 
Captain Willard (figure 3). It should be clear that, on a frame- by- 
frame basis, both films will exhibit very different entropy meas-
ures—as is clear from plots of the entropy levels for the first 
1800 frames of each (figure 4). Equally, however, what should 
emerge is that there are marked differences in the variance of 
the entropy across both films. Though neither exhibits a particu-
larly large variation, the overall spread of entropy in Apocalypse 
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Figure 5 Box plots for Heider- Simmel and Apocalypse Now.
Now is much wider than in Heider- Simmel, and would likely 
be wider again in a longer selection (figure 5). What this serves 
to show is that a measure like the IQR (the numerical interval 
in which the middle 50% of the data lie) is likely to offer the 
best measure of the entropy of a sequence of film. Where this 
range is narrow and lies close to 1, the film will be concrete and 
exhibit high entropy; where it is narrow and closer to 0, it will 
be abstract and have low entropy. Where there is a large IQR, 
there is likely no worthwhile measure of the central tendency 
of entropy, and analysis will have better results by focusing on 
shorter subsequences.
Moving on to the issue of character- based entropy, the specif-
ically filmic problem that emerges is the high cognitive load that 
the audience must sustain when they are inferring the motives 
of ostensibly unknown persons. Unlike a linguistically medi-
ated narrative, where mental states can, in principle, be directly 
communicated, acted roles are physically instantiated in real 
people and thus engage computationally expensive inferential 
processes.103 As pushing cognitive load beyond a certain point is 
typically antihedonic,104 this means that film, as a genre, perpet-
ually runs the risk of alienating its audience due to excessive 
entropy. How might this be resolved? One solution comes by way 
of the ‘star’ phenomenon. As noted by theorists such as Richard 
Dyer, ‘The star’s presence in a film is a promise of a certain 
kind of thing that you would see if you went to see the film’.105 
Though Dyer volunteers this as motivated by economics, it func-
tions equally well to reduce entropy. That is, if the presence of 
a specific actor entrains a set of performance expectations, then 
these expectations reduce cognitive load by creating a set of priors 
that prestructure the relevant inferences. Putting this in terms of 
the entropy formula, the variable i will thus pick out a member 
of the set of conventional movie roles (action hero, femme fatale, 
comic relief, maverick, wise counsellor, etc). Summing across his 
or her appearances, the presence of a specific actor will increase 
the conditional probability of a given character belonging to a 
given role, thereby providing implicit context for making sense 
of their actions. As this serves to increase predictability, it lowers 
overall entropy, and helps resolve the problem of cognitive load. 
In this sense, the star system created by the film industry oper-
ates as an entropy reduction ‘grammar’ that increases consump-
tion by lowering the cognitive demands of understanding the 
actions of person- like agents.
Bringing these considerations back to the mood disorders, 
what emerges is that abstraction is concomitant with films that 
have predictable action structures and character motivations, and 
which impose a low perceptual processing burden. Conversely, 
detailed visual innovation and eschewal of ready- made associa-
tions between actors and roles creates a highly concrete cinema 
that resists predictability. Once more, the question is whether the 
latter type of cinema is therapeutically efficacious for depression, 
where the latter is for anxiety. Such experimental testing as has 
been conducted supports the general idea that cinema can have a 
therapeutic impact, though there are no data that can be parsed 
in terms of abstraction and concreteness in cinematic representa-
tion and how they serve to differentially impact on mood disor-
ders. Thus, even more than image and narrative, cinema remains 
a terra incognita with respect to its clinical impact. It remains 
possible—even plausible—that it has a palliative effect on condi-
tions like depression and anxiety, but this needs to be supported 
by well- designed experiments. Given the popularity of cinema 
relative to other cultural forms, there can be little doubt that 
supporting the emergence of an effective cinematherapy by 
doing so would be a socially valuable outcome.
ConCLusIon
My aim in this study was to show that abstraction provides a 
useful metric for grouping together observations about how 
culture and mental health might interact. Necessarily, this is 
a speculative undertaking from which no definitive conclu-
sions can be expected—which is as well, because no definitive 
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conclusions have emerged. However, what will hopefully 
be in evidence is that mid- level measures like abstraction, in 
virtue of how they shape information- bearing structures, can 
be used to bridge the gap between mental illnesses that them-
selves actively shape the processing of information.106 If this 
is allowed, how might such a research programme be taken 
forward?
The first issue that would need to be addressed centres on the 
question of content. In the interests of exposition, I have set to 
one side all considerations of how subject matter might impact 
on the reception of abstract and concrete modes of representa-
tion—despite the obvious fact that content (rather than form) 
is often the primary driver of response. The problem this 
poses is how content can be made susceptible to systematic 
hypothesis testing. One solution might come from dimensional 
accounts of emotion like the valence- arousal- dominance (VAD) 
model, which maps variation between emotions into varia-
tions in the degree to which each of the three components are 
associated with a stimulus.107 Though experimentally investi-
gating a system that has four parameters of variation is a formi-
dable task, it is not intractable, and will certainly nuance the 
abstraction- derived model explored here. Moreover, there are 
now available large corpuses of words and images that have 
already assessed for how to trigger the VAD components, 
which makes the creation of experimental materials substan-
tially easier.108
A second issue comes with the parallel problem of interpersonal 
variation. Several studies show that a preference for abstraction is 
either a driver or concomitant of stable personality traits.109 What 
remains unclear is how this preference relates to anxiety, depres-
sion and CLT effects. It may be, for instance, that it merely moder-
ates susceptibility to CLT effects, and can thus be controlled for 
experimentally. But it may also be that it is implicated in prone-
ness to anxiety or depression in the first place, which makes for a 
more complicated model. Either way, this interaction needs further 
research before a complete picture can emerge.
Finally, there is the issue of how the cognitive effects proposed 
here might be instantiated in the brain. In this regard, recent work 
on predictive processing and the free energy principle shows that 
entropy plays a crucial role in how organisms optimise for error 
reduction in their interaction with the world.110 The crucial idea 
is that organisms minimise ‘surprisal’—expressed as the log prob-
ability of a given stimulus—by either updating their model or 
probing the environment to gain better data. However, tolerance 
for surprise is not fixed, and is likely to be mediated by the predic-
tive actions of the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems.111 As 
these systems are also implicated in mood disorders,112 this opens 
a potential avenue of connection between CLT- style cultural effects 
(as mediated by entropy) and the neurotransmitters involved in 
the regulation of mood. Though I can do no more than point to 
this possibility here, recent work by Carhart- Harris et al on the 
‘entropic brain’ model and the impact of serotonin on active and 
passive coping suggests how it might be pursued by linking the 
surprisal of a cultural stimulus (relative to background cultural 
entropy) to the differential activation of 5- HTA1 and 5- HTA2 
serotonin receptors.113
I do pretend that these considerations are enough to defend 
the present survey against its limitations. But they may point to 
solutions that obviate the need to reject the abstraction hypoth-
esis merely because it is difficult to assess. With respect to the 
hypothesis itself, only further testing can establish whether it has 
value. Though such testing with cultural materials will always be 
difficult, I submit that the potential gains—therapeutic and intel-
lectual—make it a practice that will richly reward being pursued.
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